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Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, & Shleifer [Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2008] put 
forward a model of coarse thinking. The essential idea behind coarse thinking is that 
agents put situations into categories and then apply the same model of inference to all 
situations in a given category. We extend the argument to strategies in a game-theoretic 
setting and propose the following: Agents split the choice-space into categories in 
comparison with salient choices and then choose each option in a given category with 
equal probability. We provide an alternative explanation for the puzzling results obtained 
in a Bertrand competition experiment as reported in Abbink & Brandts [Games and 
Economic Behavior, 63, 2008] 
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In an interesting paper, Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, & Shleifer (2008) put 
forward a model of coarse thinking. The essential idea behind coarse thinking is that 
people put situations into categories and then apply the same model of inference to all 
situations in the same category. In this paper, we show that an extension of the idea of 
coarse thinking to strategies can explain the collusive outcome in a Bertrand duopoly 
experiment with increasing marginal costs. The experiment is conducted by Abbink & 
Brandts (2008).  
We propose the following. Consider a two-player setting. Each player sees the set 
of choices available to him or her as well as the other player in terms of categories. The 
categories are formed by spitting the choice-space into various categories around salient 
choices. That is, there are salient choices (choices that stand-out or are prominent for 
some inherent reason) and categories are formed in relation to them. Once grouped into 
categories, each option in a given category is chosen with equal probability.  
Arguments for coarse thinking abound in the social science literature. 
Zaltman(1997), Lakoff (1987), Edelman (1992), Kahneman & Tversky (1982), and 
Gilovich (1981) are a few examples.  In this paper, we study what happens when such 
thinking is allowed in the simplest (two-player) of strategic settings. We find that we are 
able to provide an alternative explanation for the collusive outcome in a Bertrand 
duopoly with increasing marginal costs. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we present the relevant results 
from a Bertrand duopoly experiment as reported in Abbink & Brandts (2008). In section 
2, we show how players engaged in coarse thinking give rise to the outcomes reported in 




   2
 
1. Bertrand Competition with Increasing Marginal Costs 
 
Abbink & Brandts (2008) conduct a series of experiments simulating Bertrand 
competition with increasing marginal costs and with two, three, and four firms in the 
industry. They presented participants with a table of choices. The relevant table is 
reproduced here as table 1. The table simulates a Bertrand duopoly competition with 
increasing marginal costs. Each of the two players is asked to choose a number between 1 
and 39 simultaneously.
1 If the number (price) chosen by a player is the lowest, his or her 
payoff is shown in column two. If there is a tie (both players choose the same number), 
the payoff to each player is shown in column three. And, if the price chosen is not the 
lowest, the payoff is zero. This set-up simulates a Bertrand duopoly with increasing 
marginal costs in a controlled laboratory environment.  It is easy to see that any choice 
between 13 and 30 (both numbers included) is a Nash equilibrium. The payoff dominant 
Nash equilibrium is 30. There were 50 trials in Abbink & Brandts (2008) implying that 
significant learning opportunities were present.  Figure 1 shows the results from the 
experiment. As can be seen, 33 is the most frequent choice, even though it is not a Nash 
equilibrium. Furthermore, 24 is the second most frequent choice. Other choices range 
from 25 to 32. There is a whole set of Nash equilibria (13 to 23) which are never selected. 
How can the results be explained? Abbink and Brandts (2008) argue that there is a 
dynamic learning process leading to the observed outcomes. Here we provide an 
alternative explanation based on coarse thinking. In this paper, we only discuss the 
duopoly case. Extension to multi-players is a subject of future research. 
                                                 
1 Since in this paper we are only focusing on a Bertrand duopoly, only a 2-player table is shown. A longer 
version of the paper considers the situation with three and four players. See Siddiqi (2009) 
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Table 1 
Number 
chosen by you 




Profit if this number 
is the lowest and chosen by 
you and the other player 
Profit if this number 
is not the lowest 
39  784  489  0 
38  783  503  0 
37  777  514  0 
36  763  522  0 
35  743  528  0 
34  716  532  0 
33  683  533  0 
32  642  532  0 
31  596  528  0 
30  542  522  0 
29  482  514  0 
28  415  503  0 
27  341  489  0 
26  261  473  0 
25  174  455  0 
24  81  434  0 
23  -20  411  0 
22  -126  385  0 
21  -240  357  0 
20  -360  326  0 
19  -487  293  0 
18  -621  257  0 
17  -761  219  0 
16  -908  179  0 
15  -1062  136  0 
14  -1222  90  0 
13  -1389  42  0 
12  -1563  -8  0 
11  -1743  -61  0 
10  -1930  -116  0 
9  -2124  -173  0 
8  -2340  -234  0 
7  -2532  -296  0 
6  -2745  -361  0 
5  -2966  -429  0 
4  -3193  -499  0 
3  -3427  -571  0 
2  -3667  -646  0 







2. Coarse Thinking about Strategies 
 
We propose the following. 1) Agents split the choice space into categories with reference 
to salient choices. 2) All choices in a given category are chosen with equal probability. 
A quick glance at table 1 reveals that there are two choices that stand out. Firstly, there is 
the choice of 24, which is clearly salient because it is the lowest price that guarantees a 
non-negative payoff. Secondly, there is 33 which is the price at which the collusive 
payoffs are maximized (highest payoff in column 2). That is, players eager to collude will 
pay special attention to this price.
2 Also, prices from 1 to 12 can be ignored since they 
guarantee a non-positive payoff.  We have the following 5 categories: 13 to 23, 24, 25 to 
32, 33, 34 to 39.  Each player now sees a  5 5× matrix of payoffs rather than looking at a 
39 39×  (or 27 27× ) matrix of payoffs. Table 2 shows the payoff matrix. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Price corresponding to the highest payoff in column 1 is not salient since a player targeting a column 1 
outcome is looking to choose a price lower than his or her competitor. Obviously, that cannot happen with 







  13-23  24  25-32  33  34-39 
13-23  -399.6, -399.6  -654.2, 0  -654.2, 0  -654.2, 0  -654.2, 0 
24  0, -654.2  434, 434  81, 0  81, 0  81, 0 
25-32  0, -654.2  0, 81  88.4, 88.4  431.6, 0  431.6, 0 
33  0, -654.2  0, 81  0, 431.6  533, 533  683, 0 
34-39  0, -654.2  0, 81  0, 431.6  0, 683  396.3, 396.3 
 
 
The payoffs are calculated as follows. In each category, a player chooses a particular 
price with equal probability.  For example, consider the category (13-23), the probability 
of choosing any price in this category is 1/11. For a given player, there are two 
possibilities; either both players choose the same price or the given player chooses a 
lower price. In the first case, the expected payoff to the player is 22.27 and in the second 
case the expected payoff to the player is (421.86). That gives an overall expected payoff 
of (399.6). 
The Nash equilibria in the game with coarse thinking about strategies are: (24, 24),  
(25-32, 25-32) & (33, 33).  This is a remarkable match with the results reported in  
Figure 1. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Firstly, the coarse thinking model makes precise falsifiable predictions. For example, 
payoff structure can be altered to create additional equilibria or reduce the number of 
equilibria. The predictions can then be tested in controlled laboratory experiments. 
Secondly, further experiments are needed to guide theory in extending the coarse 
thinking approach to a multi-player setting. There are no apriori reasons to assume 
anything about how the presence of more than one competitor affects the formation of 
categories in the mind of a player. Are the competitors lumped together or are perceived 
separately? The answer to this question, which is essentially an empirical question, is   6
crucial for further research in this area. However, from the experiment in Abbink & 
Brandts (2008), it appears that each player is considering the competitors together as one 
unit. Such lumping together reduces the attractiveness of the collusive outcome. Abbink 
and Brandts (2008) report weakening of the collusive outcome with three and four 
players. 
There is also a need to extend this approach to other games such as ultimatum 
barginaing and Nash demand games. Researchers typically only report average outcomes 
in these experiments. However, the coarse thinking approach is aimed at explaining the 
entire distribution of observations (particularly, the mode of a distribution). All these 
issues are subjects of future research.     7
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